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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
asserts a timely objection to arbitration will not be denied judicial
consideration.
CPLR 7503(c): Court of Appeals sanctions service-not receipt-as suffi-
cient to satisfy statute of limitations; First Department decries "trick"
service of notice of intention to arbitrate.
Despite the legislative mandate that "[t]he civil practice law and
rules shall be liberally construed .. . "73 CPLR 7503(c) has been ac-
corded an extremely stringent interpretation. Postulating that the ten-
day period within which to apply for a stay of arbitration is a statute
of limitations, 74 courts have simply pointed to their inability to grant
a time extension, even when the parties have so agreed,7 as ground
for refusing to review "untimely" applications.7 6 Furthermore, by
positing that practical considerations are irrelevant when jurisdictional
issues are involved 77 courts have demonstrated little reluctance in
vitiating service of an application for a stay of arbitration where the
moving papers were not received within ten days78 or were not served
directly upon the party demanding arbitration7 9 or were served pur-
suant to the three-day extension provided by CPLR 2103(b) for service
of interlocutory papers.8 0 Interesting indeed, will be the lower court's
reaction to two recent appellate pronouncements.
In Empire Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levy8' the Appellate Division,
First Department, announced that the judiciary has not been rendered
completely impotent by CPLR 7503(c): the expiration of the ten-day
period does not preclude a subsequent application for a stay of arbitra-
tion when the notice of intention to arbitrate is deliberately served
73 CPLR 104.
74 See Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295
N.Y.S2d 853 (1st Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 758, 760-70 (1970).
75 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d
223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.). But see N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 17-103
(McKinney 1964).
76 Compare CPLR 201 with CPLR 2004.
77 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't
1970), rev'd, 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
78 Compare Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S2d 406
(1st Dep't 1970) with Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Anness, 62 Misc. 2d 592, 308 N.Y.S.2d 893
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JonN's L. R V. 145,
173 (1970).
79 Compare State Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.YS.2d 928 (2d
Dep't 1968) with Bauer v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't
1969).
80 See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d
Dep't 1969).
8135 App. Div. 916, 316 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dep't 1970).
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in a manner to hinder or prevent timely objection. Petitioner's New
York City office had been negotiating an accident claim with respon-
dent; yet, the notice of intention to arbitrate was mailed to petitioner's
office in Rockville Centre. In reversing an order denying a stay of
arbitration the appellate division reasoned that if such tactics were
permitted a nationwide insurance company could be served anywhere
and, consequently, the ten-day period would be virtually nonexistent.
Inasmuch as "the validity of the ten-day limitation depends upon
the sufficiency of the notice,18 2 the First Department's decision in Levy
might not represent a significant departure from earlier cases which
permitted late applications where the notice requirements of the
CPLR n had not been met.84 Nonetheless, such an expansive interpreta-
tion of precedent does evidence a judicial sensitivity to the burdens im-
posed upon the recipient of a notice of intention to arbitrate who must
act within ten short days. A more profound appreciation of these
exigencies was manifested in Knickerbocker Insurance Co. v. Gil-
bert.85
In Knickerbocker a notice of intention to arbitrate was received
on December 1, 1969. On December 11, petitioner posted by certified
mail a notice of petition for a stay of arbitration, which was received
by respondent's attorney on the following day. The Appellate Division,
First Department, ruled that the application was untimely inasmuch
as the moving papers had not been received within ten days. The Court
of Appeals reversed.
Essentially, the Court reasoned that there is no justifiable ground
for precluding an application which is mailed on the tenth day after
receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate. For, the draftsmen of the
CPLR intended that the application to stay arbitration remain as-
similated to service of a motion which does not require actual receipt
82 Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26, 31, 22 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1939).
83 The notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name and address of the
claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also,
notice must be given the recipient that unless an application is made within ten days
after such service, he will be precluded from raising the "threshold questions." CPLR
7503(c).
84 See Napolitano v. MVAIC, 26 App. Div. 2d 757, 272 N.Y.S.2d 220 (3d Dep't 1966)
(notice served by ordinary mail) rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d 271, 234 N.E2d 433, 287 N.Y.S.2d 393
(1967); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neithardt, 24 App. Div. 2d 941, 265 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1st Dep't 1965)
(party demanding arbitration failed to include his address); Unipak Aviation Corp. v.
Mantell, 20 Misc. 2d 1078, 196 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959) (demand did not
specify subject matter in dispute).
85 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971), rev'g, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1970). See also The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. RaV, 530
(1971).
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to be effected. 6 Moreover, in the Court's opinion its construction
would allow a full ten days and no more- in which to act, thereby
preserving the underlying purpose of the preclusionary caveat: to
prevent a party from participating in the arbitration with the option
of asserting threshold objections should the arbitration be proceeding
unfavorably.8 7 Finally, the Court recognized that a contrary decision
might discourage a party from utilizing the mailing proviso of CPLR
7503((). Such an effect would be unfortunate particularly in view of the
shortness of time in which the petitioner has to act.
Additionally, the Court sanctioned service of the moving papers
upon an attorney rather than upon the party himself. It had been held
that this mode of service was jurisdictionally defective.88 The Court
ruled, however, that since many arbitration agreements incorporate
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, 9 which permit
service of all papers upon an attorney, there is in effect a designation
of the attorney as an agent for service of process.90
Certain aspects of Knickerbocker appear abstruse, especially the
pre-occupation with what the advisory committee intended rather than
a concern for the statute as finally enacted. 91 In addition, it is difficult
to comprehend why the Court made only a fleeting reference to Jona-
than Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 2 a case which is
largely responsible for much of the inequities that have arisen in the
lower courts. Nonetheless, in view of the framework within which the
Court was compelled to operate, Knickerbocker is a well-reasoned
decision. Although there was no intimation that the ten-day period
should no longer be deemed a statute of limitations, the Court has
at least afforded the practitioner a full ten days in which to act and in
86 See 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 20. . . FouRTH REPORT OF TnE Conf. oN PRACT. &
PROC. 80-81.
87 See id. at A-244; 8 WK&M 7503.25.
88 State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (1968):
While (CPLR 7503) subdivision (c) provides for an alternate method of service,
it does not change the general rule that initiatory process must be served upon
the party over whom jurisdiction is sought to be acquired and not upon his
attorney. (Emphasis in original).
But see Bauer v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969), dis-
cussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 135, 158 (1969).
89 AERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, RULES OF COmimERCIAL ARBITRATION No. 80.
90 Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1963).
91 Although the Advisory Committee intended that the procedure upon an applica-
tion to stay arbitration remain assimilated to a motion, CPLR 7502(a) provides: "A
special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first application arising out
of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion in a pending action."
92 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JonN's L. REv. 758, 760 (1970).
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the process has restored some semblance of practicality to an area of
law which has engendered some very harsh results.
CPLR 7511(b)(1): Court establishes criteria for review of award ren-
dered at compulsory arbitration.
Much that has been theorized concerning article 75 is premised on
the notion that parties are free to select a private forum in which to
settle their disputes thereby waiving a portion of the substantive and
procedural law of the state.93 Implicit in many of the decisions regarding
arbitration is the attitude that since the parties have voluntarily agreed
to arbitrate they have no cause to complain if the proceedings are not
entirely satisfactory.94 Indeed, CPLR 7511(b)(1) reflects the judicially
created maxim that an arbitrator's award cannot be vacated for errors
of law or fact.95 Under this section, the grounds for overturning an
award focus primarily on the integrity of the participants and the
arbitrator rather than on the wisdom of the award.98
In addition to their refusal to scrutinize an arbitrator's award,
courts have also manifested a reluctance to examine the submission
agreement in the first instance.97 For example, in National Equipment
Rental Ltd. v. American Pecco Corp.,98 the respondent sought an order
modifying the petitioner's reservation of "the right to request other
and different relief" in addition to a demand for a specified sum. Noting
the arbitrator's power to grant any remedy or relief deemed just and
equitable,9 the Appellate Division, First Department, declined to
circumscribe the demand. For, the court was of the opinion that where
the dispute to be submitted to arbitration is adequately set forth, the
93 See, e.g., Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85,
227 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1962); Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St. Fashions, 285 App. Div. 710,
159 N.Y.S.2d 612 (lst Dep't) aff'd 309 N.Y.2d 709, 128 N.E.2d 416, 103 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1955).
94 E.g., Amtorg Trad. Corp. v. Camden Fibre Mills, Inc., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d
606 (1952).
95 Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
96 But see Granite Worsted Mills v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d
168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
145, 175-76 (1970).
97 One situation, however, wherein the courts are compelled to supervise the arbitral
process, concerns a conflict between an arbitration agreement and an appraisal agreement
under CPLR 7601. It has recently been ruled that when such a conflict arises it is for the
court to decide which mode of private-dispute settlement takes precedence. See American
Silk Mills Corp. v. Meinhard-Commercial Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 197, 315 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1st Dep't 1970). See also Dimson v. Elghanayan, 19 N.Y.2d 316, 227 N.E.2d, 10, 280 N.Y.S.2d
97 (1967).
98 35 App. Div. 2d 132, 314 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1st Dep't 1970).
99 AmucAN AmBrrRA ON AssocixioN, Rum-s oF Com.mRcaAL ARBrraAnON § 42; see
also Matter of De Laurendis (Cinematografica), 9 N.Y.2d 503, 174 N.E.2d 736, 215 N.Y.S.2d
60 (1961); Matter of Staldinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
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